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1. Introduction 
 
Major advances in computer and information technology now occur outside the boundaries of the 
firm, in communal settings where self-directed volunteers produce non-proprietary goods in Ethical-
Modular Organisations or EMOs (O’Neil, 2015). Firms have embraced EMO-produced Free and 
Open Source Software (F/OSS) and are paying the salaries of developers in F/OSS projects 
(Gonzalez-Barahona and Robles, 2013; Mansell and Berdou, 2010; Riehle et al., 2014). Aside from 
limiting the number of firm employees who sit on project boards (as is the case in GNOME for 
example), there are few formal processes delineating how F/OSS projects should deal with paid 
workers. Examples include bounty programs, companies like TideLift, and initiatives such as the 
recent Community Bridge by The Linux Foundation or the GitHub Sponsors program, as well as 
explicit crowdfunding by F/OSS developers.  
 
At first glance, the coming together or ‘hybridising’ of commercial and communal systems represents 
a challenge for both parties: firms paying workers to participate in F/OSS projects must relinquish 
control of the contributions of their employees, or risk compromising these persons’ status in the 
project (Benkler, 2013). Conversely volunteers being paid by firms could lead to project autonomy 
being compromised, conflicts of interest arising, and trust amongst participants being undermined. Is 
this the case? In this article, we show that the firm-project hybridising process is both widely accepted 
within a F/OSS project, and the source of fundamental challenges to the F/OSS development model. 
We present the results of an online survey of participants in Debian, a voluntary F/OSS project where 
the results of work are socialized,1 which garnered more than 1,400 responses (including 261 Debian 
Developers), and we complement it with in-depth interviews with 13 Debian Developers. We show 
how commercial interests unfold in a F/OSS project, and how these interests are defined by project 
participants.  
 
We draw from the neo-institutional literature which describes institutions as ‘supra-organisational 
patterns of activity through which humans conduct their material life in time and space’, as well as 
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‘symbolic systems through which [people] categorize their activity and infuse it with meaning 
(Friedland and Alfort, 1991: 232). We analyse wages being paid by firms to participants in Debian as 
an original example of an organisational hybridisation process. As Friedland and Alfort (1991) point 
out, institutions are potentially contradictory and accordingly make multiple ‘institutional logics’ 
(legitimate goals and principles that guide behaviour) available to individuals and organisations. The 
clash of divergent institutional logics (or organisational hybridity) can lead to conflict. Tensions can 
result from hiring policy, as in the case of social enterprises which bring together employees with 
backgrounds in development and banking (Battilana and Dorado, 2010). In contrast, though people 
can be hired or directed to complete a task by firms within a F/OSS project, such contractual 
arrangements will always be subordinated to the non-commercial, or communal, or ethical-modular 
institutional logic which binds participants together. We accordingly posit that the intermingling of 
commercial and communal logics will need to be legitimated (Creed et al., 2002; Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005). We analyse the discourses used to legitimise firm-project cooperation as well as 
the organisational mechanisms which facilitate this cooperation. We find that one legitimation is 
closely aligned to the ethical-modular institutional logic, and aims to erase the commercial/communal 
divide, whilst another seeks to ‘professionalise’ work relations in the project. The article is structured 
as follows: the next section defines the ethical-modular institutional logic as well as the motivations 
which lead firms and projects to cooperate. Section 3 presents our case study, the Debian F/OSS 
project, and outlines our research questions. Section 4 presents our quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods. The next two sections describe our findings. We show that paid work is rife in 
Debian, and that employee status (whether working for a non-profit, a firm, or self-employed) is 
closely associated to rhetorical legitimations and organisational mechanisms in section 5. We discuss 
what this means for the understanding of the wider political economy of F/OSS and of commercial-
communal hybridisation in section 6. Conclusions are provided in section 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
2. Background: Firm-project collaboration 
The steady rise during the 1990s in the usage and delivery capacity of the Internet led to the 
development of massively distributed online projects where self-governing volunteers collaboratively 
produce public goods. Notable examples include GNU/Linux F/OSS distributions such as Debian, the 
Apache HTTP server, the GNOME desktop and the LibreOffice project, as well as the Wikipedia 
encyclopedia. These projects have generated a wealth of terminological innovation such as 
‘crowdsourcing’, ‘wikinomics’, and the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ (Brabham, 2013; Surowiecki, 2005; 
Tapscott and Williams, 2006). However focusing on ‘crowds’ does not account for the fact that non-
rival public goods are being produced. Benkler (2006) initially referred to ‘commons-based peer 
production’, then characterized ‘peer mutualism’ as ‘voluntaristic associations that do not depend on 
direct or delegated power from the state, such as proprietary strategies’ (Benkler, 2013: 217). 
Collaboration amongst ‘peers’ is central, but employees in commercial firms also use collaborative 
techniques (Bezroukov, 1999). Following Raymond (1999), Demil et al. (2013) identified a ‘bazaar 
style’ of governance. In contrast to markets and hierarchies, ‘bazaar governance’ has low incentive 
and control mechanisms and relies on open licences and self-directed participation. Online volunteer 
associations do have low controls, but suggesting that they have low incentives obviates the 
distinction between commercial and ethical logics: motivations are high, but they are not financial.  
 
2.1. The ethical-modular institutional logic  
In the neo-institutional literature, which seeks to explore the interplay of organisations and cultural 
frameworks, institutional logics (or orders) are taken-for-granted understandings that guide behaviour 
in fields of activity (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Thornton et al. 
(2012) contrast a ‘community’ institutional order based on a common boundary, the belief in trust and 
reciprocity between participants, the commitment to community values, the importance of ego-
satisfaction and reputation, etc., from a ‘corporation’ institutional order based on corporate hierarchy, 
the market position of the firm, bureaucratic roles, etc. Legitimate activity and goals in peer projects 
are self-directed, in contrast to hierarchically directed work in firms. We define the institutional logic 
of online voluntary associations as ‘ethical’, because participants are motivated by self-fulfilment and 
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the common good. This was borne out by our interviewees when they characterised their motivation 
to contribute to Debian:  
 
‘[Debian has] more impact on improving the world.’(DD1) ‘I mean, of course participating in 
Debian has a strong ethics point; nobody will deny that, but I don’t think it’s the only thing. I 
mean, working in a software distribution that has global reach and is important and has I think 
a lot of moral points for doing something of worth, something I like. This is something I am 
fascinated with.’ (DD2) 
 
In F/OSS labour is communal and outputs are orientated towards the further expansion of the 
commons; while the commons are the chief resource in this mode of production (Söderberg and 
O’Neil, 2014). We also define the institutional logic of peer projects as ‘modular’, because the 
production of commons occurs in a decentralised fashion. Some degree of modularity has been 
adopted by firms, but division into autonomous components which can be developed in parallel is the 
default setting of all peer projects, as this allows asynchronous investments by individuals with 
varying competencies (Benkler, 2006).  
 
Modular governance and the ethical logic are recursively intertwined, mutually constituting one 
another. We therefore refer to modularity not only as a design feature, but also in terms of political 
economy. In contrast to workers in traditional commercial firms, where control of intellectual 
property (IP) and strategic decision-making capacity are restricted, volunteer producers have the 
capacity to socialize the product of their labour: participants in F/OSS projects individually agree for 
there to be no restrictions on who profits. Free IP licences such as ‘copyleft’ enable contributors to 
relinquish exclusive property rights over the resource they have created. This ethical dimension of 
F/OSS is exemplified by the ‘four freedoms’ to use, copy, modify, and distribute code, in contrast to 
closed or proprietary code (Stallman, 2002). 
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2.2. Firm and project motivations for cooperation 
EMOs were originally deemed operationally superior to commercial organisations by some 
proponents, who argued that open systems reach correct results more effectively than closed or 
proprietary ones, because of the flexible manner in which massive numbers of reviewers can address 
defects or ‘bugs’ (Moglen, 1999; Raymond, 1999). The benefits of ethical-modular and commercial 
collaboration are a staple of management scholarship (Bonaccorsi et al, 2006; Dahlander and 
Magnusson, 2008; Demil et al., 2013). A primary motivation of firms is that outsourcing labour to 
volunteer projects lowers production costs. Firms may also wish to improve the quality of F/OSS 
software which could threaten one or more corporate competitors. Further, Nagle (2018) argues that 
firms who engage in the apparently irrational behaviour of helping to produce open code which can 
help their competitors, actually benefit from the learning accrued by their employees during the 
process. Firm engagement strategies include establishing completely new projects, working with 
existing EMOs, or attempting to influence the direction of development in existing EMOs (Dahlander 
and Magnusson, 2008). Well-known examples of firms which support F/OSS projects include 
information technology giants such as Google, Microsoft, and Facebook. One study found that 75% of 
‘core’ modules in GNOME were maintained by developers affiliated to firms (Mansell and Berdou, 
2010); another, that 23% of authors working on the Linux kernel were paid for their work, as were 
between 10 and 20% of developers in GNOME, Netbeans IDE, KDE and KVM (Riehle et al., 2014). 
In Debian, which adheres very closely to the ethical logic, previous studies of copyright attached to 
code found that between 6 and 7% of code contributed to Debian was owned by firms (Robles et al., 
2007). F/OSS generally does not require authors of specific pieces of code to ‘give up’ their 
copyright; authors remain copyright owners of their work but release it under a license that allows the 
work to be freely used, distributed, and modified. On the other hand, developers employed by firms 
generally have, as part of their work contracts, agreements that stipulate that their work is owned (in 
the copyright sense) by the firm, so legally speaking it is the firm that contributes and ‘owns’ the 
code, even though that specific version of the code is freely licensed. In sum, firms are paying 
developers in F/OSS projects, but the question of what this means for participants, for the project, and 
for the analytical understanding of how hybridisation occurs has not been addressed in the literature.  
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3. Case Study and Research Design 
3.1. Debian 
Debian is a GNU/Linux operating system composed entirely of F/OSS, originally released in 1993 by 
Ian Murdock. Between January and May of 2017, 1,368 individuals contributed to the project (Debian 
Contributor list, 2017). The Debian Project is supported by a community active in more than 60 
countries (Perrier, 2014) and the Debian operating system is used all over the world, as well as in the 
International Space Station (Bridgewater, 2013). Debian is famous both for its robustness and its strict 
adherence to F/OSS principles (Coleman, 2005; 2012) which makes it an ideal candidate to study how 
communal and commercial logics interact. It represents an attempt to make the ‘bazaar’ viable, with 
norms aiming to reduce tensions, but also moral, with institutions aiming to reduce unequal relations 
(Auray, 2007). The project has a highly developed governance structure. Its Social Contract spells out 
goals and its Constitution defines rules. This includes the process whereby every Developer can 
launch a referendum (‘General Resolution’) on any issue concerning the project, as well as procedures 
governing the yearly election of the Debian Project Leader (DPL). DPLs have no powers of control: 
their role is one of external representation and of synthesis of new proposals (O’Neil, 2009, 2014). 
There are several categories of participants, such as non-uploading contributors; Debian Maintainers, 
whose ability to release new versions (‘upload rights‘) of software components (‘packages‘) included 
in Debian are limited; and Debian Developers, who can upload without restrictions any package and 
also have the right to vote on major project-wide decisions. 
 
Firm influence in Debian is occasionally discussed. For example, it is ‘common knowledge’ among 
Debian Developers that participation in Debian will result in a contributor being targeted for 
recruitment by companies, including Google (P., 2014). Overt firm support in Debian takes the shape 
of monetary sponsorship of Debian’s annual conference, DebConf; of in-kind donations of server 
hardware; and of events such as Google’s annual Summer of Code (GSoC), a training programme 
where the firm supports the attendance of students, while participating F/OSS projects invest the 
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necessary mentoring efforts. The main advantage for the project is not the produced code, as the 
mentoring effort is significant, but rather retaining long-term contributors after the end of the yearly 
GSoC (O’Neil, 2015). 
 
3.2. Firm-project collaboration in Debian 
There is however no precise measure of the extent and impact of paid work in Debian. We seek to 
ascertain whether members of the Debian community are contributing as non-waged volunteers or as 
paid contributors. Our first research question is: 
 
RQ1: What proportion of contributors to Debian are paid by firms? 
 
How is waged labour perceived by the community? Mansell and Berdou (2010) write that workers 
being paid by firms to contribute to the commons does not affect the ‘cooperative spirit’ of F/OSS 
projects. Is this the case in Debian? We address the issue by researching to what extent paid work is 
openly discussed amongst participants, and what it entails for the allegiance of developers. Our 
second research question accordingly probes individual perceptions of firm influence: 
 
RQ2: To what extent do developers acknowledge and discuss paid work in the project, and how does 
paid work affect their loyalty to the project? 
 
Hybrid organisations combine different institutional logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and 
Santos, 2010). We seek to understand how commercial and communal logics actually hybridise. More 
specifically, since we posit that hybridisation requires legitimation, identifying rhetorical strategies as 
well as enabling organisational mechanisms will enable us to unpack how hybridisation operates in 
the project. Our third research question is thus: 
 
RQ3: How is hybridisation occurring in the project? Are rhetorical legitimation strategies and 
organisational mechanisms being deployed? 
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4. Data Collection 
4.1. Quantitative data  
We created a survey using the online LimeSurvey tool. In addition to questions on motivations for 
contribution and employer interest in the Debian project, we gathered demographic information, 
including age, country of residence, education level, and status within the project. The survey was 
conceived and administered jointly with members of the Debian community, which explains the 
extraordinarily high response rate (we received 1,479 responses). It was announced on Debian lists on 
November 6, 2016 and remained open until December 4, 2016. 
 
Whilst there are approximately 1,000 Debian Developers, it is estimated that only 300 are currently 
active in the project (private communication with the Debian Account Managers2); the response rate 
of 261 for this category was thus very high. Project members engaged in dialogue with one another 
and with the survey administrators about the survey; there was strong interest within the community 
in the survey results.3 
 
4.2. Qualitative data  
The second phase of the research project involved in-depth semi-structured interviews with thirteen 
Debian Developers based in Western Europe and Central and North America. Participants were 
recruited at DebConf in August 2017. Interviews were conducted in French and English by phone or 
videoconference in late August 2017. We documented the Developers’ age, gender, employment 
status and whether they were paid to work on Debian, then enquired about a range of issues such as 
whether employers directed Debian work, whether participants had witnessed efforts to hide firm 
interests, whether they felt conflicted about their allegiance, etc. After completing transcripts, we 
performed an iterative process of thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006) by carefully 
parsing the transcripts for emerging themes, then cross-checking amongst authors for validity. The 
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survey and interviews were approved by the University of Canberra Human Research Ethics 
Committee. 
5. Legitimising paid work in Debian 
5.1. Prevalence of paid work in Debian 
Survey participants were overwhelmingly male (95%) and between the ages of 30-50 (73.4%). They 
were highly educated (86.8% have obtained an undergraduate degree, and 42.5% have a Masters’ 
degree). Table 1 presents a cross-tabulation of work status and of status within the project.  
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Table 1 (All participants) 
What is your current "formal" status in the Debian project? * Which of the following best describes your 
current work status? Cross tabulation 
 
Which of the following best describes your current work 
status? 
Total 
Employe
d 
Contracto
r/ Self-
employed/ 
Independe
nt worker 
Owner 
/ 
manag
er of 
my 
compa
ny 
Unemploy
ed 
Retire
d 
What is 
your 
current 
"forma
l" 
status 
in the 
Debian 
project
? 
Project 
Member 
("DD") 
Cou
nt 
203 32 12 8 1 256 
% of 
Total 
21.6% 3.4% 1.3% 0.9% 0.1% 27.3% 
Project 
Member, 
non-
uploading 
Cou
nt 
12 3 0 1 0 16 
% of 
Total 
1.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 1.7% 
Debian 
Maintaine
r 
Cou
nt 
67 7 1 8 0 83 
% of 
Total 
7.1% 0.7% 0.1% 0.9% 0.0% 8.8% 
Contribut
or with no 
formal 
project 
associatio
n 
Cou
nt 
227 54 20 31 4 336 
% of 
Total 
24.2% 5.8% 2.1% 3.3% 0.4% 35.8% 
User 
(every 
other 
Debian 
user) 
Cou
nt 
183 28 12 20 4 247 
% of 
Total 
19.5% 3.0% 1.3% 2.1% 0.4% 26.3% 
Total 
Cou
nt 
692 124 45 68 9 938 
% of 
Total 
73.8% 13.2% 4.8% 7.2% 1.0% 
100.0
% 
 
 
Overall 73.4% of respondents were employees, 13.4% were contractors or self-employed, and 4.8% 
manage their own business. Debian Developers or DDs (79%) and Maintainers (80%) were more 
likely to be in waged work than Contributors (67.5%) or users (74%). 
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Table 2 (All participants) 
 
Do you run Debian on your work computer? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid 
Yes 569 38.5 67.6 
No 273 18.5 32.4 
Total 842 56.9 100.0 
Missing  637 43.1  
Total 1479 100.0  
 
Please note. ‘Missing’ means the number of potential respondents who have not responded. ‘Valid’ 
refers to the breakdown of responses excluding ‘Missing’. 
 
67.6% of respondents declared that they run Debian on their computers at work (73.6% for DDs). 
DDs have the capacity to influence the strategic direction of the project, so their attitude towards firm 
influence in the EMO is of particular interest. Table 3 shows that of the 216 who answered this 
question, only 54 (25%) asserted that their firm was a stakeholder in Debian. 
 
Table 3 (Debian Developers) 
 
Does your firm engage with the Debian project or consider itself a stakeholder in 
Debian? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid 
Yes 54 20.7 25.0 
No 162 62.1 75.0 
Total 216 82.8 100.0 
Missing  45 17.2  
Total  261 100.0  
 
This should be contrasted to Table 4, which cross-tabulates status within the project to whether 
participants are being paid to produce F/OSS. 928 respondents answered the question ‘Are you paid to 
contribute to Debian?’,170 (18.3%) in the affirmative (the definition of ‘contribute’ in this case was 
left to the respondent). 253 Developers addressed the questions, with 93 (36.8%) answering in the 
affirmative; this is a significant figure. As expected, this proportion is much higher than that of 
Maintainers (18%), Contributors (15%) and Users (6%). 
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Table 4 (All participants) 
What is your current “formal” status in the Debian project? * Are you paid to contribute to Debian? 
Crosstabulation 
 Are you paid to 
contribute to Debian? 
Total 
Yes No  
What is your current 
“formal” status in the  
Debian project? 
Project Member  
(“Debian Developer”) 
 
Count 93 160 253 
% of 
Total 
10.0% 17.2% 27.3% 
Project Member, non 
uploading 
 
Count 3 13 16 
% 
of Total 
0.3% 1.4% 1.7% 
Debian Maintainer Count 15 68 83 
% of 
Total 
1.6% 7.3% 8.9% 
 
Contributor with no 
formal project association 
 
 
Count 
 
45 
 
297 
 
342 
% of 
Total 
4.8% 32.0% 36.9% 
User (every other Debian 
user) 
Count 14 220 234 
% of 
Total 
1.5% 23.7% 25.2% 
 
Total 
 
Count 
 
170 
 
758 
 
928 
% of 
Total 
18.3% 81.7% 100.0% 
 
 
Few Developers spend a significant amount of their paid time working on Debian (only 3 report 
spending more than 80% of their work time contributing to Debian). Table 5 indicates that 70 
respondents, or 79.5% of valid responses, report spending 0-20% of their work time contributing to 
Debian.  
 
Table 5 (Debian Developers) 
 
How much of your work time is spent contributing to Debian? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid 
0-20% 70 26.8 79.5 
21-40% 11 4.2 12.5 
41-60% 2 .8 2.3 
61-80% 2 .8 2.3 
81-100% 3 1.1 3.4 
Total 88 33.7 100.0 
Missing  173 66.3  
Total 261 100.0  
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In order to elucidate perceptions of paid work in the project, we asked participants questions about 
whether they have co-workers who are also Debian contributors (Table 6) and whether they 
acknowledge their firm in the project (Table 7). 
 
Table 6 (All participants) 
 
What is your current "formal" status in the Debian project? * Do you have coworkers that 
are also Debian contributors? Crosstabulation 
 
Do you have coworkers 
that are also Debian 
contributors? 
Total 
Yes No 
What is your current 
"formal" status in 
the Debian project? 
Project Member 
("Debian 
Developer") 
Count 100 126 226 
% of 
Total 
14.0% 17.6% 31.6% 
Project Member, 
non uploading 
Count 5 9 14 
% of 
Total 
0.7% 1.3% 2.0% 
Debian Maintainer 
Count 23 47 70 
% of 
Total 
3.2% 6.6% 9.8% 
Contributor with no 
formal project 
association 
Count 81 177 258 
% of 
Total 
11.3% 24.7% 36.0% 
User (every other 
Debian user) 
Count 34 114 148 
% of 
Total 
4.7% 15.9% 20.7% 
Total 
Count 243 473 716 
% of 
Total 
33.9% 66.1% 100.0% 
 
The highest number of participants who answered positively whether they have co-workers who also 
contribute to the project were Debian Developers (100), followed by Contributors with no formal 
project association (81). In relative terms 226 Developers answered the question with 44.2% 
responding in the affirmative whilst 258 Contributors responded, 45% positively. 
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Table 7 (All participants) 
 
Do you publicly acknowledge your organization (employer, client, etc.) when contributing to Debian 
on paid time? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid 
Yes 79 5.3 54.5 
No 66 4.5 45.5 
Total 145 9.8 100.0 
Missing  1334 90.2  
Total 1479 100.0  
 
Whilst 170 participants declared they are paid to contribute (see Table 4), 145 participants weighed in 
on whether they publicly acknowledge the organisation paying them when they are contributing to 
Debian during paid time, with only 79 (54.5%) responding in the affirmative (Table 7). This suggests 
that a significant amount of paid contributions to the project are made without formally recognizing 
the interest third-party organisations have in Debian. If we narrow the focus to Developers (Table 8) 
we find that 81 addressed the question of whether they publicly acknowledge the entity paying them, 
with a higher proportion (58%, N: 47) answering in the affirmative. 
 
Table 8 (Debian Developers) 
 
Do you publicly acknowledge your organization (employer, client, etc.) when contributing to Debian 
on paid time? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid 
Yes 47 18.0 58.0 
No 34 13.0 42.0 
Total 81 31.0 100.0 
Missing  180 69.0  
Total 261 100.0  
 
The number of Debian Developers answering the question ‘Do you communicate with co-workers 
about your firm’s interests in Debian?’ was much lower: only 52 responded, out of which 41 (78.8%) 
said ‘yes’ (Table 9). The high proportion of positive responses suggests a strong desire to 
communicate about Debian with co-workers (in the case of those who addressed the question), whilst 
the overall low response rate compared to related questions such as whether one is being paid to 
produce F/OSS (Table 4, 253 respondents) or even whether paid employment is acknowledged (Table 
8, 81 respondents) might indicate a reluctance to confront the possibility of conflicts of interest.  
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Table 9 (Debian Developers) 
 
Do you communicate with co-workers about your firm's interests in Debian? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid 
Yes 41 15.7 78.8 
No 11 4.2 21.2 
Total 52 19.9 100.0 
Missing  209 80.1  
Total 261 100.0  
 
To be sure, this low response rate could also be caused by DDs working in different areas of a firm 
and consequently not interacting with each other.  
 
In terms of the embodiment of firm interests within the project, our qualitative data suggest that 
developers are keenly aware of boundaries and employ techniques such as purposefully using their 
corporate or professional email address to signal whether their contributions originate from paid work 
time, or not. Clarity about who is speaking is particularly important if exploitative tendencies are 
deemed to be at work in firms: 
 
We changed the way we do things in our team because it was a very internally focused team 
and they basically just saw Debian as, ‘We can get the code and then we can do whatever we 
want internally’ […] Not just give back [to the project] because it is right but also long term 
that just makes much more sense because there is so much overlap in the work. So it is just a 
much more sustainable approach. I might say, ‘We at [firm x]’ and then I say, ‘Well, we at 
Debian.’ I think it is very important to be aware and to make it clear who are you speaking 
for. (DD3) 
 
To the question of whether they are more passionate about their job or the project (Table 10) a high 
number of Debian Developers answered ‘neither’ (105, whilst 94 chose ‘Debian’, and 30 ‘job’). The 
‘neither’ number was similarly high for Contributors with no formal project association (108), 
however the numbers who chose ‘Debian’ (80) and ‘job’ (62) were much closer, as was the case with 
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Users (‘Debian’ 56, ‘job’ 29). Unsurprisingly DDs are more invested in the project than other 
categories of respondents. 
 
Table 10 (All participants) 
 
What is your current "formal" status in the Debian project? * Do you feel more passionate 
about your (paid) job or about Debian? Crosstabulation 
 
Do you feel more passionate about 
your (paid) job or about Debian? 
Total 
Debian 
(Paid) 
job 
Neither / 
equal 
 
What is your 
current "formal" 
status in the 
Debian project? 
Project Member 
("Debian 
Developer") 
Count 94 30 105 229 
% of 
Total 
13.2% 4.2% 14.8% 32.3% 
Project Member, 
non-uploading 
Count 4 4 6 14 
% of 
Total 
0.6% 0.6% 0.8% 2.0% 
Debian 
Maintainer 
Count 25 12 27 64 
% of 
Total 
3.5% 1.7% 3.8% 9.0% 
Contributor with 
no formal project 
association 
Count 80 62 108 250 
% of 
Total 
11.3% 8.7% 15.2% 35.2% 
User (every other 
Debian user) 
Count 56 29 68 153 
% of 
Total 
7.9% 4.1% 9.6% 21.5% 
Total 
Count 259 137 314 710 
% of 
Total 
36.5% 19.3% 44.2% 100.0% 
 
All interview participants expressed strong loyalty to the project, over their employer. Most 
Developers had been active in Debian for a long time: 
 
A lot of people join Debian much earlier than joining any company, and a lot of people have 
changed more companies than Debian. (DD4) 
People have loyalty to their employer and understand that they are paying the bills – but I also 
think, at the end of the day, most people who are really serious about F/OSS put the project as 
number one. I mean if you ask someone to do something bad they’re not going to do it. Either 
they are going to convince you that it doesn’t make sense or they are going to block it or 
something. (DD3) 
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5.2. Rhetorical strategies and organisational mechanisms  
Interviewed developers fell into three categories: developers were either employed by a non-profit 
institution, by a large IT firm, or they worked as freelancers. A clear finding arising from the 
interview data is that the type of work developers engaged in consistently matched the type of 
rhetorical strategies they put forward, as well as the organisational mechanisms they referred to. The 
alignment between employee status, organisational mechanisms and legitimation is summarised in 
Table 11. 
 
Table 11 
 
Alignment between employee status, organisational assemblages and practices, and 
legitimation 
 
Employee status 
 
Firm requirement Organisational 
assemblages and 
practices 
Rationale and 
legitimation 
 
Current/future 
tension 
Employed by 
non-profit 
 
N/A N/A ‘Mission aligned 
with Debian’ 
N/A 
Employed by 
firm  
 
Specific needs Use of firm 
email; 
Project-centered 
team; 
Presentation at 
Debconf 
Firm/project 
synergy 
(including use of 
free licenses by 
firms); 
Peaceful 
coexistence 
Firm may require 
feature 
incompatible with 
project 
Self-employed  
 
Maintain old 
version of 
distribution 
Dunc Tank; 
LTS 
Making the 
bazaar viable; 
Distinct identity 
emerges; 
Project diversity 
Challenges 
volunteer 
participation  
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Absence of legitimation strategies and of organisational mechanisms 
Our central point is that the activity of firm employees and of F/OSS project participants is 
understood as being structured by different institutional principles or logics – a commercial logic for 
firms, a communal logic for projects. Discursive legitimations and concrete practical arrangements are 
needed for organisational hybridity to function, for firms and projects to cooperate. We define these 
practical arrangements as organisational mechanisms and practices which enable firm-project 
collaboration. These mechanisms can be classified in two categories: those occurring in firms, such as 
project-centered teams, and those occurring in the Debian project, such as work groups which 
introduce new behavioural guidelines. Other practices, such as presentations of firm projects during 
DebConf or the of professional emails to signal that work on the project was paid for by a firm, are in 
effect located both in firms and projects.  
 
In some cases it can be observed that no organisational mechanisms or legitimation strategies are 
present. This occurs when a firm is like a project, that is to say when it’s not a firm: in case A, Debian 
Developers are employed by non-profit organisations. These Developers describe a close fit between 
the institutional logics governing the project and that governing their employers. This is why there are 
no specific requirements by the firm and no need for new practical mechanisms to emerge.  
 
It's not exactly the [non-profit] giving me assignments to do something in Debian, but there's 
a lot of overlap within what we do in our work with Debian. (DD5) 
 
First phase of legitimation (around licenses): firm-project synergy 
Before unpacking rhetorical legitimation strategies, it is useful to remind ourselves of the intensity 
and depth of firm-project collaboration. A recent example of firm engagement is when Google 
adopted Debian as its internal operating system (instead of its derivative Ubuntu) in 2017. Several 
Developers mentioned that firms such as Google are supportive of their employees attending 
DebConf, Debian’s annual conference. However, as mentioned earlier, Google’s actions are only the 
latest example of a long line of commercial firm investments in F/OSS. This phase began in the late 
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1990s, after the rebranding of Free Software as ‘Open Source’, firms such as IBM, Oracle and Sun 
committed to finance F/OSS projects; in 2002 IBM developers started formally contributing to 
Apache and Linux (Broca, 2013). The overwhelming majority of Linux code is now being written by 
employees of firms such as Intel, Red Hat, AMD, Novell and Google (Linux Kernel Contributor 
Statistic, 2019). A key turning-point was when firms renounced proprietary code in favour of its 
robust and cost-free alternative: intellectual property ceased being an obstacle to communal-
commercial hybridisation and became instead the means for firms to tap into an enthusiastic volunteer 
workforce. Debian Developers who are employed by large firms accordingly adopt the theme, whose 
seeds were planted by firms’ adoption of open licensing, of the synergy between firm and project 
labour. This convergence is not universally applied, with for example social media apps being used by 
many DDs, despite not existing in an open, F/OSS variant: 
 
People have come and given talks at DebConf about how open source has both won and lost 
this war, because it powers pretty much everything like this Linux kernel on my phone, and at 
the same time, most of the software running on it is proprietary. (DD4) 
 
Despite firms adopting open source licenses in some areas only, firms and projects are portrayed as 
inexorably coming together. In addition to open source licenses, IT firms have also embraced the 
ethical logic of self-actualisation, which can then be mobilised to characterise creative work 
irrespective of its commercial or communal aim: 
 
I don’t think there’s a distinction between when I work for the project or when I work for the 
company, it’s more like, have I done something cool, have I done something that I’m happy 
about? (DD4) 
 
In the case of firm employees, firm and project work convergence is facilitated not through formal 
‘boundary organisations’ (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008) such as foundations, but through looser, 
transient and emergent organisational mechanisms which encompass a wide variety of more or less 
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formalised arrangements. Organisational mechanisms include presentations by firm employees at 
DebConf, signalling procedures such as using corporate email addresses to indicate that a contribution 
originates from paid work time, and participation in Debian-focused teams or networks within firms. 
Employees who are Debian Developers are in a unique position to achieve desirable results for their 
firm.  
 
We wanted to have HTTPS support in the installer because here at [firm y] we use HTTPS for 
everything and Ubuntu had it, but Debian didn’t and we were basically forking the Debian 
installer in order to be able to have this HTTPS support and, yes, we can do it but it is a lot of 
work so we worked with the Debian installer team, we did part of the work and they did part 
of the work so that in the end we got to have HTTPS support in the installer […] Whenever 
we have to fork then we need to work extra to maintain those forks, we can do it, it's a tool 
that we have but we prefer not to do it if possible, so we prefer to work with upstreams, with 
Debian […] If we add a patch then we want this patch to be integrated. (DD6) 
 
In addition to open licensing and self-fulfilment a necessary condition for the commercial and ethical 
logics to be reconciled is the assurance that this reconciliation is not detrimental to the project. The 
same developer asserts:  
 
Yes, it was an interest of [firm y] to have HTTPS support but at the time I agreed with this 
interest, right, I wouldn’t have done it if I hadn’t agreed with it. […] If there was a ‘secret’ 
[firm] interest I would not follow it, no, no, whenever we have an interest we are forward in 
saying, for example, ‘We want HTTPS support’ or– there were issues with licences, with 
packages that were not correctly licenced so we talked to the maintainer saying, ‘Hey, we 
want this to be correctly licenced’, and things like that, we are really straightforward in what 
we want and, no, I don't think it's a good idea to try to hide your goals because people will 
figure them out and then it would sour relationships. (DD6) 
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Yet the coming together of ‘closed’ and ‘open’ systems may well cause some turbulence in the future. 
The synergistic rationale is threatened by two contradictions. The first has to do with preferred system 
architectures, which may lead some firms to fork from the project:  
 
[Firm z] does create Debian packages that are non-standard or rather they don’t necessarily 
follow Debian policy. And I know that’s intentional, now at what level of the company that 
was decided I don’t know. But I think one of the interests they had was probably to try to 
make it a little more common. Because they also created packages for Red Hat systems and a 
number of other systems, Ubuntu, etc. And so they were trying to make things behave the 
same across the different systems. […] I think the Debian packages for most of the [firm z] 
stuff puts everything under a single top-level directory in /opt. And does not divide up the 
files and put them in the places that they might go in a more traditional package. (DD7) 
 
In this case, the argument is over technical compatibility rather than the morality of the respective 
logics. By contrast the second zone of conflict serves as a reminder that commercial and communal 
logics differ in some important respects. Clashes may occur not over the individual rights of code 
producers, since firms embrace free licensing. Instead they stem from the discrepancy between how 
firms and project consider users, with firms ever-more eager to collect information about user 
behaviour, potentially violating F/OSS privacy principles: 
 
A lot of corporate interests push these days towards larger-scale data collection. The 
software’s being configured more and more to collect analytics basically; collect statistics 
about which buttons you’re pressing and what you’re doing and which features of the product 
you’re using, and ship all that information back to the company. That could easily make a 
company want to have its own packages because Debian is probably going to insist on that 
stuff being turned off by default, if not removed entirely. (DD7) 
 
Second phase of legitimation (around waged labour): making the bazaar sustainable 
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After employment by non-profits and by firms, a third kind of worker being paid to produce F/OSS 
code in Debian is self-employed and operates within a dedicated network specifically created to 
service smaller companies who use older versions of Debian. The Debian Long Term Support (LTS) 
Project was launched in 2014 to offer 5-year support to older distribution versions: the second phase 
of legitimation is more recent. A small independent firm was set up by a Debian Developer as an 
intermediary between firms and members of LTS. What is notable about the following statement by 
one of this firm’s organisers is that a commercial rationale is being openly expressed, with references 
to ‘competition’ from a rival project and to ‘clients’: 
 
And, in parallel to that, there is also Ubuntu which popularised this LTS concept with a 5-
year support which in a way did create a kind of competition for Debian, and we did hear 
sometimes about firms migrating from Debian to Ubuntu, only because of their LTS support. 
[…] Well after, in terms of work to be done, yes in that case we have a list of packets which 
correspond to our clients’ priority packages and on the other hand we have the Debian 
security tracker which has all the open security problems and we cross-check both, we first 
take on the security issues on packets used by our clients and when we’ve done those, we deal 
with the rest. (DD8) 
 
A DD working for a major firm described LTS in these terms: 
 
But it’s a very well-defined space, right, fix security bugs identified in this particular version 
of Debian, right, fine, it’s not the end of the world. (DD4) 
 
According to another Debian Developer involved in LTS, this activity is accepted by the community, 
provided it is perceived as not harming the project: 
 
A: I mentioned more than once that I was doing something for a customer. 
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Q: Mhm and what happened, how did they react, behave, what did they say? Was it positive or 
negative? 
A: Nothing. 
Q: Nothing. 
A: Which is usual. 
Q: Okay. 
A: Because I was not doing anything that will affect anybody else also. (DD9) 
 
Large firm employees emphasise that their paid activity slots seamlessly into Debian. In contrast 
informal networks created by self-employed developers which offer support to smaller firms feature 
organisational mechanisms which challenge project norms of behaviour: LTS depends on distinct 
practices such as specific email lists, rules, codes of behaviour, and reminders of what is acceptable, 
resulting in a disciplining of working relationships within the project: 
   
I’ve never seen contributors paid in LTS insult another Developer you know, whereas that 
happens… that happens quite… maybe not very often, but it does happen every now and then 
[in Debian] that people express themselves in a way that is, shall we say… unpleasant for the 
person opposite! (DD8) 
  
The emergence of these new practices, which inject professional elements into the more freewheeling 
project environment, is recent: 
 
I think the perhaps less notable impact, more subtle, is the progressive change in mentalities 
and the way waged work in Debian is perceived! It’s already happened a few times to see 
paid contributors mention quite openly on Debian lists that they would be OK to do this or 
that project, but that well it was big and not necessarily much fun, and that if they could be 
paid they would gladly do it whereas a few years back no-one would have dared to mention 
this kind of thing. […] At the moment it works the opposite way, to take part in this system 
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you already… have to be a Debian contributor which means you have to do something else! 
(DD8) 
 
6. The political economy of hybridising F/OSS 
Our goal was to determine how the hybridising of commercial and communal logics occurs in the 
Debian project. We found that 18.3% of project participants were paid to contribute; the number for 
DDs was much higher, 36.8% (RQ1). We determined that 54.5% of all contributors and 58% of 
Developers discussed paid work in the project, though the response rate was very low, as it was for 
the question of whether paid work was discussed with co-workers, indicating a reluctance to address 
the issue. In terms of the sense of allegiance of developers we found that Developers were more 
passionate about and more loyal to the project (RQ2). Finally we found that two contradictory 
rationales are being deployed to justify paid work in Debian, each one being accompanied by 
organisational mechanisms (RQ3). 
 
It is notable that the existence of paid work within Debian is now accepted as uncontroversial. 
Previous attempts to institutionalise waged labour in Debian took the shape of the ‘Dunc Tank’ 
proposal to remunerate Developers in 2006.4 The aim was to speed up the release management 
process.  
 
While Dunc Tank was an external effort, the perception was that Debian itself was paying 
Debian people, which is highly controversial (DD3).  
 
Some participants felt this proposal betrayed the ethical values of the project, and a General 
Resolution expressing support for the then-Debian Project Leader was amended to disassociate 
support for the DPL from DPL-supported projects such as Dunc Tank; this amendment was narrowly 
defeated (Debian, 2006). There are clear differences: LTS does not apply to the current version of the 
project, and furthermore is not organised centrally within Debian. Nonetheless LTS does involve 
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directly paying Developers for Debian-related work, so it is significant that it has not evoked strong 
adverse reactions.  
 
In contrast to the situation in social enterprises which pit development and banking logics against one 
another (Battilana and Dorado, 2010), in Debian hybridisation is not occurring through open 
contradiction and contestation between the communal and commercial logics, as the corporate voices 
of employees are muted by firms’ embrace of open source licenses and employee self-fulfilment: 
there is no ‘identity schism’ (Battilana and Dorado, 2010) between polarising logics. Yet our study 
does bring to light contrasting understandings of what it means to contribute to a peer project, and of 
who can afford to produce F/OSS.  
 
For Richard Stallman, whose opinions have historically carried some weight in this debate, F/OSS 
produced by free labour will always be preferable to non-free software produced by decently paid 
waged labour: the defence of the ‘four freedoms’ (to use, copy, change, and redistribute modified 
versions of software) matters more than the fair distribution of profits stemming from software 
development (Broca, 2018). This normative stance was made very early in the history of free 
software. In the GNU Manifesto, R. Stallman contends that ‘there is nothing wrong with wanting pay 
for work, or seeking to maximize one's income’, but only ‘as long as one does not use means that are 
destructive’. Indeed ‘extracting money from users of a program by restricting their use of it is 
destructive’ (Stallman, 1985). Over the years, when asked to comment on the valuation of open 
source companies and the fact that they benefit from unpaid voluntary labour, R. Stallman has given 
the same answer: these issues are secondary. They are mainly ‘a distraction from what really matters: 
that these programs (e.g. free software) are available for everyone to use in freedom and community’ 
(Stallman, 2018). In other words, the free software movement should consider software as resources 
upon which users have certain rights, not as products of a labour that deserves monetary retribution. 
Hence, free riding that is not based on enclosing code but on free labour is not a major concern. An 
illustration of this view’s pervasiveness occurred when open source firm Redis attempted to introduce 
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a new ‘Commons Clause’ licence to limit Amazon’s free riding and was denounced as ‘clueless’ by 
prominent F/OSS community members (Vaughan-Nichols, 2019). 
 
Yochai Benkler’s near-canonical accounts of peer production (2006, 2013) also insist on the altruistic 
or passionate intrinsic motivations of peer producers, who will need to find means of subsistence 
outside peer production. A few voices have also risen from within the F/OSS community against 
generating funds to compensate developers for their labour. The simplicity and elegance of F/OSS 
code is born of necessity, goes this argument; the introduction of money means developers will start 
embellishing code to fill the amount raised, resulting in ‘consultant ware’, needlessly complex 
software which requires expert advice to run; if intrinsic motivations are replaced by the marketplace, 
the ‘magic and beauty’ of F/OSS will be lost, according to the creator of the popular Ruby on Rails 
open source Web application framework (Heinemier Hansson, 2013). Studies of F/OSS developer 
motivations have uncovered a range of views on the matter, with one interviewee expressing 
resistance to payment on the grounds that ‘(…) as far as I am aware, there would seem to be an 
inverse correlation to [financial] motivation and actual ability as a developer’ (Krishnamurthy et al., 
2014: 634). 
 
In contrast, other actors in the F/OSS community have claimed that ‘open source has a working-for-
free problem’, with some launching firms with the explicit aim of providing independent open source 
maintainers with a reliable income (Pennington, 2019). In the same vein a candidate for the 2019 
Debian Project Leader election proposed in his election platform that Developers should be able to 
make Debian their careers if they chose to, thanks to increased firm involvement and grants 
(Michlmayr, 2019). A few months later the issue was revived on Debian’s Project list where it 
generated a robust debate, with some Developers arguing that introducing financial rewards risked 
distorting Debian’s emergent and self-directed means of determining the relative value of project 
goals (debian-project, 2019) 
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This perspective acknowledges the reality of firm support for F/OSS but argues that the highly 
distributed nature of this support, as well as the ethical norms of F/OSS, guarantee project autonomy. 
Yet this rejection of financial rewards in the project fails to address the social stratification which 
results in 1.5% of F/OSS developers being female, against 28% for proprietary software (David et al, 
2003; Kuechler et al, 2012; Dryden, 2013). Indeed the relationship of ethical-modular organisations to 
existing social hierarchies is seldom evoked in terms of class, with gender often framed as the most 
significant source of power imbalances (Nafus, 2012). That voluntary labour in ethical-modular 
organisations is only accessible to a minority is obvious. However it is not only women who do not 
have the disposable income, cultural capital, or family support to engage in unpaid labour (Huws, 
2013).   
 
Our data reflect these tensions. When an interviewee asserted that producing F/OSS at work allowed 
him to ‘save on [his] free time’ (DD10), the motivation seems to be entirely hedonistic. In contrast 
others point out that the work they are doing is ‘not gratifying’ (DD8). This more prosaic conception 
views participation as a form of necessary drudgery which deserves fair compensation. This led 
another participant to question the social basis of the ethical-modular logic: 
 
Who can contribute for free? I ask myself, who has the privilege to do that, who are they, well 
they are white men, upper middle class, which means there is a political dimension which is 
brought by these people into the project. These people have a certain posture, a certain 
opinion, which naturally conforms to a whole section of society. I think that in this respect 
there is fundamentally a problem. If there is no risk of burnout at least there is an issue of 
representativity as people are not compensated for their participation in the project. (DD11) 
 
If volunteer work is intrinsically linked to a form of social domination (only those with the requisite 
cultural and economic capital may take part), this has implications for a peer project’s long-term 
viability. It may well be possible for volunteer projects to persist and even thrive in a technical sense 
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with a highly restricted membership base; but there might come a time when this restricted base is 
viewed as exclusive or even discriminatory, and popular use and support might dwindle accordingly. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Our quantitative and qualitative analysis provides clear and novel evidence of the extent, perception 
and impact of paid work within the Debian project. Paid work is widely accepted, but rarely 
acknowledged or discussed. We have shown that the process of hybridisation between commercial 
and communal logics occurs in two ways. A first phase of legitimation blurred the distinction between 
firm and project work. This synergy depended on firms embracing open source licenses. 
Organisational mechanisms and practices include presentations at DebConf and the use of 
professional email accounts. Nonetheless large firms may pose threats to the project: a firm forking 
would entail losing a major user, whilst establishing a different standard also has huge ‘commercial’ 
implications. Yet firm employees do not emphasize commercial rationales and instead mainly refer to 
communal ones, with firm enrolment framed in terms of ethically enabling passionate labour. This 
legitimation, which papers over the foundational difference between communal and commercial 
logics, is challenged by how user privacy is considered in projects and firms. It also raises the 
question of whether firms are ‘free riding’ on the volunteer labour of project contributors who are not 
employed by firms. This question is far from new, with early research into F/OSS noting that firms 
were ‘harvesting the altruism’ of volunteer developers (Haruvy et al., 2003), resulting in a relationship 
between ‘altruistic individuals and selfish firms’ (Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2004). Yet this old question 
takes on new significance with the central position that F/OSS now occupies in the digital economy; 
as does the related question of the fair sharing of the benefits of this free labour. This in turn calls 
attention to the fact that the economic model of commons-oriented peer production has yet to be 
articulated with social rights and social welfare (Maurel, 2019). 
 
Conversely, a second, emergent legitimation phase focuses on how volunteer modular labour can 
operate in a sustainable fashion. This contradicts the absolute freedom of traditional F/OSS by 
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introducing new organisational mechanisms between the commercial and communal worlds, such as 
work groups within the project and associated norms of professional behaviour. Our analysis of the 
organisational hybridising process thus implies an updating of the motivational issues which 
preoccupied researchers fifteen years ago (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Haruvy et al., 2003), as we show 
that motivations and values are linked to the employment status of Developers.  
 
Domination in projects used to be expressed through an internal/external dichotomy, with certain 
categories of people being unable to take part in the project. The introduction of commercial interests 
may allow more entities to take part in the project, but does not reduce domination, which is 
expressed differently: through a hierarchy of contributors. Some are employed by large firms and able 
to hedonistically work on exciting code, whilst others are self-employed with their only option being 
to carry out drudge work. 
 
The project’s ethical-modular or communal logic depicts Debian as free from mercantile interests. 
Although large firms do play a role in Debian via paying some Developers’ salaries, the influence 
these firms exert on the project is either unacknowledged or minimised by Developers. Money has 
long been a ‘taboo’ subject in F/OSS (Eghbal, 2016). As long as financial transactions occur outside 
Debian, they will not affect it, goes the argument. It remains to be seen to what extent this economic 
model (in which the self-directed production of public goods is supported by revenue generated 
outside itself) will be reshaped by emergent forces seeking to connect peer production to waged 
labour on the one hand, and to new forms of social rights on the other. 
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